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RECENT CASES

fertilized ovum within her, ". ..
drastically interferes with a woman's right to control the use of her own body. ' 73 "If 'the bedroom
[in Griswold] is a sanctuary of marital privacy, the law cannot
74
regard a married woman's reproductive organs differently."
The Belous decision not only invalidated the "necessary to preserve" type statute, but also placed the validity of any abortion
statute in question. The State does not have an interest in protecting
the fetus before viability, and the woman's right to privacy allows
abortion as she may desire. The fetus has lost the Battle. While the
shot fired at Lexington was the shot heard round the world, the
decision in Belous may well be the shot heard round the nation.
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ney of the Commonwealth and Chief of Police seized a motion
picture being shown by the lessee of a motion picture theatre. The
lessee brought an action to enjoin the seizure. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted an injunction requiring return of the film and prohibiting the seizure of any
other film until its obscenity had been determined in an adversary
hearing.
The Commonwealth's attorney and Chief of Police appealed. The
Court of Appeals held that an adversary hearing was required to
determine obscenity before seizure of the motion picture and
reversed that portion of the injunction prohibiting seizure of the
film, and ruled that the lessee must make a copy of the film reasonably available to the Commonwealth's attorney. Tyrone, Inc. v.
Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969).
In rendering its decision in this case, the court was quick to
point out that its decision would not determine the obscenity of the
seized movie,' nor the constitutionality of the statute under which
the movie was seized. 2 Thus, the only issue for decision was
whether a hearing on the obscenity of a movie is necessary before
its seizure for use in a prosecution under an obscenity statute.
The defendants sought the injunction against seizure on the
grounds of an alleged violation of First, Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.3
73. Med. Deans Brief at 20-21.
74. Ziff 23.
1. Tyrone, Inc v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639, 640 (4th Cir. 1969).
2. T2he statute under which the movie was seized was VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-227 to
18.1-236.4 (1960).
3. The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964
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In 1964 the Supreme Court held in A Quantity of Books v.
Kansas4 that the seizure of all copies of specified titles of books
without a hearing on the question of the obscenity of the books
5
prior to seizure was constitutionally deficient.
In passing upon a similar question relating to the seizure of a
movie without a prior hearing to determine its obscenity, the United
States Court of Appeals held in Metzger v. Pearcy6 :
The lesson of Books is that law enforcement officers
seize allegedly obscene publications without a prior
sary proceeding on the issue of obscenity. Such a
violates the First Amendment to the Constitution
United States, and
is a prior restraint condemned
7
Supreme Court.

cannot
adverseizure
of the
by the

In the two aforementioned cases the courts seem to have ruled
that while obscene publications may be seized and used in a prosecution under an obscenity statute, they must be adjudged obscene
before they may be so seized and used.
The case which set the standard for obscenity prosecutions and
constitutional safeguards was Roth v. United States.8 The United
States Supreme Court held in that case, inter alia, that the test to
be applied in determining whether a publication was obscene or
not was whether the material appeals to the prurient interests of
the beholder., The decision did much to expand the field of constitutionally protected publications, but it did not extend protection
to obscene publications. The Court said: "[I]mplicit in the history
of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
without redeeming social importance."' 0
In Smith v. California" the Supreme Court said, "But our holding in Roth does not recognize any state power to restrict the dissemination of books which are not obscene; . . .- 12 But the problem
'had become not how to determine obscenity, but when it must be
determined in order to guarantee all requisite constitutional rights
afforded by the First Amendment. It therefore became necessary
to determine whether a publication was obscene or not before it
was submitted to seizure by state officials, because if it were an
obscene publication, it would not be entitled to Constitutional safe4. 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
5. Id. at 210.
6. 393 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1968).
7. Id. at 204; cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) ; Kingsley Int.
Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) ; Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378) U.S. 184 (1964).
8. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
9. Id. at 487.
10. Id. at 484.
11. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
12. Id. at 152.
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guards. However, if it were a non-obscene publication, it must be
afforded the protection of the First Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court had apparently decided that all publications
were entitled to First Amendment protections until a hearing took
place to determine their obscenity, but the same day that Roth was
decided, the court also decided Kingsley Books Inc. v. Brown.13
In that case the defendant was enjoined from disseminating material allegedly obscene. The action was taken under authority of a
New York statute giving the state supreme court jurisdiction to
enjoin the sale or distribution of obscene articles. Any local official
had the authority to maintain an action, 14 and a hearing as to
obscenity was to be held within one day following joinder of issue. 15
If, after the hearing, the defendant was found to be in violation of
the statute, he was required to surrender the materials to the sheriff
16
of the county.
The case came to the Supreme Court on a claim that the statute
in question violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
The Supreme Court upheld the statute saying that:
The method devised by New York in § 22-a for determining whether a publication is obscene does not differ in
essential procedural safeguards from that provided under
many state statutes making the distribution of obscene
17
publications a misdemeanor ....
The court in Kingsley answered the claim that the injunction
constituted a prior restraint on constitutionally protected publications, by saying that protection from previous restraint is not
absolutely unlimited. 18
Thus, the real rule after Roth and Kingsley appears to have
been that obscene publications weren't constitutionally protected,
and non-obscene publications were. However, dissemination of questionable materials could be enjoined pending adjudication of their
obscenity, provided that the statute enjoining dissemination did not
operate oppressively. 19
The question then becomes what constitutes a proceeding which
operates so as to be oppressive. In Marcus v. Search Warrant0 the
court supplied a partial answer to the question. There the state had
13.

354 U.S. 436 (1957).

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

N.Y. CODE CRIM. Peoc. § 22a(1) (McKinney 1958).
Id. at § 22a(2).
Id. at § 22a(3).
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 443 (1957).
Id. at 441, citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

19.

See generalay Freund, The Supreme Court and CUt4l Liberties, 4 VAN.

L. REv.

533

(1951). The Supreme Court cited Freund, with approval in Kingsley Books, Ino. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436, 442 (1957).
20'. 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
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seized large quantities of allegedly obscene publications under the
strength of a search warrant issued after a short ex parte hearing
on the issue of obscenity. The Supreme Court condemned this method
of seizure:
[u]nder the Fourteenth Amendment, a state is not free
to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with
obscenity as here involved without regard to the2 1 possible
consequences for constitutionally protected speech.
The court distinguished Marcus from Kingsley in a number of pro22
cedural and substantive instances.
In A Quantity of Books v. Kansas,2 3 the sheriff was authorized
by judicial authority to seize copies of certain books which, in the
opinion of the issuing magistrate, were obscene. Such opinion was
reached after a forty-five minute ex parte hearing by the judge on
the probable obscenity of the books. The Supreme Court reversed
the decision and stated as follows:
It is our view that since the warrant here authorized
the sheriff to seize all copies of the specified titles, and
since (the owner) was not afforded a hearing on the question of the obscenity even of the seven novels before the
warrant 2 issued,
the procedure was likewise constitutionally
4
deficient.
In Books the Court again found that the constitutional safeguards
necessary in such seizures were not met. The sheriff was authorized
to seize all copies of specified titles, the statute afforded the state
ex parte relief rather than a hearing before seizure, and a hearing
25
was not required for ten days in the Kansas statute.
These two cases draw significant distinctions between the procedures under the New York statute and procedures under the Missouri and Kansas statutes. It is important to note, however, that
no real statement of what actions may or may not be taken in a
seizure of allegedly obscene materials was made.
21. Id. at 731.
22. Id. at 735-738. Briefly stated, the differences between the two cases were: (1) The
New York proceeding was begun by a domplaint naming specific publications; the proceeding in Marcus was against diverse publications without specifying titles. (2) The injunction in Kingslep operated only against the named publioations. In Marcus a mass seizure took place. (3) In Kingsley the distributor still had the opportunity to distribute the
opublications and in a prosecution under an obscenity statute raise the claim of non-obscenity as a defense. In Marcus this was impossible because the publications had been
actually seized, not merely kept from circulation by injunction. (4) A hearing as to the
i4ssue of obsclenity was provided for in the New York statute "within one day" after
joinder of issue. No similar provision existed in the Missouri statute in operation In this
case.

23.
24.
25.

378 U.S. 205 (1964).
Id. at 210.
KAN. GnN. STAT. ANN. § 21-1103(C)

(1964).
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The problem becomes even more acute in the case of seizure
of films where, unlike books, perhaps only one or two copies are
available. Kingsley seems to stand for the proposition that only a
proceeding which still allows the distributor the option of disseminating the materials at the risk of prosecution is valid. Marcus and
Books seem to stand for the proposition that elimination of this option
by seizure is constitutionally deficient. Then in the case of movies, if
only one copy is available, it would appear that seizure, prior to
determination of obscenity is indeed also constitutionally deficient
because the same elimination of the distributor's option to disseminate the publications then exists as existed in Marcus and Books.
For this reason, almost all state censorship laws which have been
challenged have been found to be unconstitutional prior restraints
on First Amendment rights.26 The state must, when seeking to
exercise its power to prevent dissemination of allegedly obscene
material, establish precise objective standards for judging the work,
and procedural safeguards that will insure protection of constitutional publications.2 7 In addition, these standards must be statutory
and not based upon a common law notion of nuisance.2 8
The purpose for these strict limitations is readily apparent. The
courts here are seeking to provide the maximum protection to the
freedoms of speech and expression and their method of doing so
is to closely limit the manner in which a state or municipality may
proceed against suspect publications. This is no new trend or relaxing of the standards of decency. As early as the Roth decision the
Supreme Court stated:
The fundamental freedoms of speech and press have
contributed greatly to the development and well-being of
our free society and are indispensible to its continued
growth. Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword to prevent their
erosion by Congress or by the States. The door barring
federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar;
it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest
crack necessary 29to prevent encroachment upon more important interests.
The instant case appears to have opened the door wider than
the Court recommended in Roth. By holding that the hearing need
not be a fully matured action at law,3 0 the court seems to have
retreated from the traditional position of strict procedural and ob26. See Interstate Cir. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 682-83 (1967), and cases cited therein.
27. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51 (1964).
28. Grove Press, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 300 F. Supp. 281, 287-88 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
29. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1956).
30. Tyron, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639, 641 (4th Cir. 1969).
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jective standards to a position allowing considerable discretion to
the authority seeking to prosecute a person dealing in allegedly
obscene materials.
It may be true that in the instant case no prior restraint
exists, because only one of the four copies of the film which were
available was seized, i.e., given over to the Commonwealth's attorney. However, in a situation where only one copy of a film was
available, a prior restraint might well exist if the defendant were
required to surrender that copy prior to the hearing on the issue
of obscenity.
In addition, the court in making its decision in the instant case
cited Kingsley as support for the lack of necessity of a judicially
perfect hearing. However, Kingsley is distinguishable from the instant case in a number of important ways. First, the statute involved
in Kingsley was a civil sanction in the form of an injunction; in
the instant case, violation of the statute is a criminal offense."'
Second, in Kingsley the hearing was statutorily provided for within
one day of joinder of issue;3 2 the Virginia statute makes no such
provision. Finally, in Kingsley, nothing was seized. The disseminator
of the allegedly obscene materials was merely enjoined from further dissemination. He could still continue to distribute the publications, in violation of the injunction in the hope that the publications would not be obscene and he would not be punished for
violation of the injunction.3 3 In the instant case the possibility has
been raised that the state could take into possession the only available copy of a publication, especially a movie, and thereby accomplish the prior restraint looked upon with so much disfavor by
34
the Supreme Court in Marcus.
If the states are allowed to take into their possession publications which have not yet been found to be violative of an obscenity
standard, one of the most fundamental of our Constitutional freedoms will be seriously threatened. If allegedly obscene publications
can be reached without being found obscene, it is not a very long
step to more stringent controls upon publications critical of the
government and its officials prior to a determination of their violation of any existing law. Nor would controlled news seem to be
an impossibility. A television film critical of a city political machine
might be seized as a "protective measure," without any hearing as
to the propriety of such action or the illegality of the film.
Perhaps legislative relief from the evils of obscenity could be
sought in the form of more severe punishment for conviction under
31.
32.
33.
34.

§ 18.1-228 (1960').
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 22a(2) (McKinney 1958).
See Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S, 717, 735-36 (1961).
Id.
VA. CODr ANN.
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obscenity statutes, but any attempt at curtailing or limiting obscenity
must take effect only after a true judicial determination of that
issue. To require an adversary hearing prior to seizure of an allegedly obscene movie, and then compel the holder of that movie
to supply his prosecutor with a copy of it on the grounds that the
hearing need not be a fully matured action at law, is merely to
substitute the concept of "supplying" for the act of seizing; in the
opinion of this writer, this constitutes a prior restraint on publications condemned by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
DWIGHT
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The defendants are members of the Founding Church of Scientology,
a group which professes the ability to rid one of mental and emotional disturbances, primarily by a process termed "auditing", using
a device known as an E-meter. The Government seized the defendant's E-meters and attempted to link their use with certain statements found in Scientology literature, which were alleged to be
false or misleading.' The Government attempted to establish that
these statements were "labeling" of the type prohibited under the
2
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act "False or misleading label" clause,
in that they were "written, printed or graphic matter . ..accompanying such article."' 3 The defendants appealed from a judgment
and decree of condemnation and destruction of the E-meters and
certain large quantities of literature.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
found that much of the literature the Government used to show
false or misleading "labeling" was not such within the meaning of
the statute, in view of First Amendment protections, and reversed
the judgment. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States,
409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit,
found that the Founding Church of Scientology was incorporated in
the District of Columbia as a religious organization, and that the
defendants had presented a prima facie case that the church was a
religion. The court further found that most of the literature relied
1. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1159 (D.C. Cir.
1969), the, court mentions the following as an example: "Cancer has been eradiclated by
auditing out conception and mitosis".
(4th ed. 1961).
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21

2. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 321(m)
(1964).
3. Id.; United States v. Urbuteit, 335 U.S. 355 (1948); V.E. Irons, Inc. v. United
States, 244 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1957).

